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Crossing the ..,ubicon 
Ryan C. Hendrickson examines the chain of events 
leading to Operation Deliberate Force, NATO's first air 
campaign In Bosnia and Herzegovina, and their 
significance ten years on. 
Earty in the morning of 30 Augus11995 NATO airaalt 
launched a series of precision slrfkes agains1 seleaed 
1argets in Serb-held Bosnia and Herzegovina. This 
heralded the s1artofOperation Deliberate Foroe, NATO's 
firs! air campaign, !ha! lasted for two-and-a-half weeks, 
shattered Bosnian Serb communications and effectively 
ended !he ·out-of-area· debale Iha! had dominated intra-
Alliance discussions on NATO's role since !he end of !he 
Cold War. 
Allhough extremely controversial at the time, a decade on 
it is clear !hat Operation Deliberate Force and !he 
judicious use of air power was critical to bringing !he 
Bosnian War to an end wllh enormous political 
consequences and obvious benefits for Bosnia and 
ProgrNa rtp0t1: A<lmr .. Leighton W. 
Smth, ~of Alt,ea- F«ees 
SoutNm EUtCPt. P'QVi<iM an update 
on Optt111•on Deltoetat• Foree, NATO's 
fit1 t w caT01tQ1"1 (0 AFSOUTH) 
Herzegovina. In addlbon, !hough subsequently overshadowed by Operation Allied Force, the 
Alliance's much longer air campaign In Kosovo in 1999, Operation Deliberate Force may 
have contributed more to NATO's posl-Cold War transformation than any other single event 
In spite of Bosnia and Herzegovina's eventual imporlance to NATO, the Alliance was slow to 
join international el\'orts to end fighting In the former Yugoslavia. When violence erupted in 
1991, first the European Community and then the United Nations took the lead In seeking to 
halt the conftlct and restore peace and s1ability. At the time, the United States had just led a 
UN-approved coalition to drive Saddam Hussein's Iraq out of Kuwait and there was great 
optimism about !he United Nations' potential to promote a •new wortd order". 
The Bosnian War proved an extremely sobering experience for !he United Nations and all 
International Institutions that became Involved in negotiations to end the connlct. The UN 
Protection Force (UNPROFOR), which eventually grew to 38 000 troops, was tasked with 
delivering humanitarian assistance to those in need and providing ·safe areas" In which 
civilians should not be harmed. Bui it was expected to remain politically neutral and was not 
mandated to enforce a particular settlement. since no settlement had been agreed. The 
phrase !hat encapsulated UNPROFOR's predicament at !he time was !hat !he Unl1ed Nations· 
blue berets were ·peacekeepers with no peace to keep". 
While UNPROFOR struggled to achieve its objectives, NATO was Itself seeking to come to 
terms with the end of the Cold war. In 1991 at their Rome Summit. NATO heads of siate and 
government agreed to a New Strategic Concept, enabling the Alliance to go beyond 
collective defence and to conduct new security missions, lnduding peacekeeping, conftla-
prevention and crisls-managemen1 activities. In this way, in 1994 and the first half of 1995, 
NATO used foroe In limited slrfkes agains1 Bosnian Serb milllary targets In response to 
violations of various UN Security Council Resolutions. Under the military guidance of 
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, General George Joulwan, the Alliance also helped 
police a UN arms embargo against the whole of the former Yugoslavia and economic 
sanctions against Serbia and Mon1enegro. 
NATO's early forays Into Bosnia and Herzegovina failed to change the political realities on 
the ground and prompted many analysts to question !he Alliance's relevance In the post-Cold 
War security environment. Many perceived NATO's role In the Balkans as especially 
troubling, given !he extent of the humani1arian suffering taking place In what was after ell 
NATO's backyard. In an oft-repeated refrain, bolh NATO supporters and NATO critics argued 
that the Alliance would have to go ·out of area· or ii would go ·out of business·. 
As international media maintained blanket coverage of the conflic~ dissatisfaction grew with 
the international community's piecemeal and inadequate response. Although most 
UNPROFOR soldiers served with distinction and 167 lost their lives in the course of the 
mission, UNPROFOR's inability to influence the dynamics of the conflict enabled the Bosnian 
Serbs to make a mockery of the UN mission. Indeed, both NATO Secretary General Willy 
Claes and his predecessor Manfred Worner became Increasingly outspoken about the 
United Nations' Inability to end the crisis and the need for NATO to take on a greater role. 
Despite this, the Allies themselves were unable to build the necessary political consensus for 
a more robust approach during 1994 and the first half of 1995 and continued to debate the 
most appropriate course of action. 
NATO's inertia was, in part, a reflection of UNPROFOR's composition. Many Allies including 
Canada, France and the United Kingdom, had deployed their own peacekeepers in 
UNPROFOR and feared that a more robust approach towards the Bosnian Serbs would 
produce a backlash against their troops. Meanwhile, the United States, which did not have 
troops on the ground, was pushing a "lift and strike· policy- lifting the arms embargo against 
the entire region that penalised in particular the Bosnian Muslims and striking the Bosnian 
Serb targets from the air. 
To be sure, US diplomatic pressure for change remained cautious. The deaths of 18 US Army 
Rangers in an ambush In October 1993 in Mogadishu, Somalia, which effectively ended the 
UN peacekeeping mission to Somalia, continued to cast a long shadow over policy-making. 
Senior US officials and Pentagon planners had no intention of becoming engaged in another 
poorly planned operation risking combat casualties where clear national security Interests 
were not at stake. Moreover, CIA analysts estimated that it would take thousands of ground 
troops to restore the peace. 
The turning point was the Srebrenlca massacre of mid-July 1995. The single greatest atrocity 
of the Wars of Yugoslavia's Dissolution that resulted in the deaths of close to 8000 Bosnian 
Muslim men and boys, shocked world opinion and galvanised Washington to steer NATO in 
a new direction. In US President Bill Clinton's White House, National Security Advisor 
Anthony Lake, who according to lvo Oaalder's Getting ro Dayton: The Making of America's 
Bosnia Policy (Brookings Institution Press, 2000) had long advocated a more robust 
approach, took the lead in pushing the Allies in a new direction. 
The United States was not alone in urging a new, more robust Allied approach to the Bosnian 
War. Attitudes towards the Bosnian Serbs had been hardening even before the Srebrenica 
massacre especially after UN peacekeepers, many of whom were French, were taken 
hostage In May 1995. In this way, French President Jacques Chirac was equally vocal about 
the need for a radically new and more interventionist policy. 
One critical policy change introduced in early August 1995 was a reworking of the "dual-key' 
arrangement, which had been established in 1993 to govern the use of force by NATO. The 
arrangement required that NATO military action be approved by both UN and NATOofliclals. 
Until August 1995, Yasushi Akashi, the UN Secretary-General's Special Representative in 
Yugoslavia, held the United Nations' key. After Srebenica, Akashi's key was given to 
UNPROFOR's military commander, French General Bernard Janvier. The NATO key was 
held by Admiral Leighton W. Smith, Commander of Allied Forces Southern Europe In Naples. 
The event that triggered Operation Deliberate Force took place on 28 August 1995, when a 
Serb mortar fell upon a market place in Sarajevo, killing 38 civilians and injuring 85 others. 
With General Janvier away at that time, British Lieutenant-General Rupert Smith turned the 
UN key in coordination with Admiral Smith, indicating that the Bosnian Serbs had yet again 
violated a UN Security Council Resolution and that this time NATO would respond with force. 
Operation Deliberate Force was launched as soon as the 
last UNPROFOR troops left Bosnian Serb territory. The 
bombing was briefly interrupted due to a cease-fire 
negotiated by General Janvier on 1 September, but it 
resumed in the early hours of 5 September. Almost all 
the then 16 NATO Allies contributed in some way to the 
The judicious use of air power 
was critical to bringing the 
Bosnian War to an end 
campaign, which Involved a total of 3515 sorties and the dropping of 1026 bombs at 338 
individual targets. There were no NATO casualties, though a French Mirage 200K was shot 
down on the first day of the campaign and the crew captured by the Bosnian Serbs. 
Among the many Individuals Involved In Operation Deliberate Force, NATO Secretary 
General Willy Claes played an especially inftuential role behind the scenes. Although Claes· 
personal political problems In Belgium have cast a shadow over his legacy and obliged him 
to leave NATO after less than a year and a half in office. he can take much credit for ensuring 
that the Alliance saw Deliberate Force through to a successful coneluslon . 
In his short period as NATO Secretary General, Claes showed himself to be a determined 
leader who was prepared to keep the Norlll Allan tic Council In session ror hours until 
consensus could be reached, especially in the 1ead-0p to Deliberate Force. According to 
Richard Holbrooke's account In To End A war(Random House, 1998), Claes also aclively 
supported both of the Smiths when the keys were wmed, allowing the air campaign to 
proceed without additional debate from the Allies. When General Janvier negotiated a 
temporary cease-fire with Bosnian Sertl military commanders, Claes placed considerable 
diplomatic pressure on him, other UN officials and the Norlll AUantic Council to resume the 
air strikes, arguing that NATO had to demonstrate greater resolve to Change attitudes on the 
ground. 
Claes' relationship with General Joulwan was also Important to the success or the air 
campaign. When General Joulwan requested political support to use Tomahawk missiles 
against Bosnian Serb military positions In Banja Luka, Claes backed him. The use of the 
Tomahawks In the early morning hours of 10 September generated some criticism, even 
among NATO Ambassadors, but today Is considered by military analysts such as Colonel 
Robert c . Owen In Oellberate Force: A Case Study in Effec~ve Air Campaigning (Air 
University Press, 2000) to have been significant in demonstrating NATO's resolve and 
therefore likely to have helped bring the conftict to an end. 
In the wake or Operabon Deliberate Force. the Bosnian Sertls round It Increasingly difficult to 
retain territory they had held since the earty months of the Bosnian War In the lace of a 
concerted ollenslve lnvoMng Croatian as well as Bosnian Croat and Bosnian Muslim forces. 
As a result they were more willing to negotiate an end to the war In talks that got under way 
in Dayton, Ohio, on 1 November than they had been ea~ier in the conftlct In ellect Operation 
Deliberate Force helped pave the way for the Dayton Peace Agreement which succeeded in 
establishing the governing framework for Bosnia and Herzegovina that remains In place to 
this day. 
Almost a decade since It came Into force, the Dayton Peace Agreement has not managed to 
resolve Bosnia and Herzegovina's conftict and the peace process Is yet to become self-
sustaining. More than 7000 troops, most of them deployed since December 2004 under the 
European Union's auspices, remain In the country and international administrators continue 
to play an Intrusive role In Bosnian political life, frequently overruling local officials. 
Nevertheless. the Dayton Peace Agreement succeeded in ending Europe's bloodiest conftict 
since the Second World War. which had taken more than 100 000 lives during the previous 
four years. And It gave Bosnians the opportunity to rebuild their country and with It a better 
future for themselves. 
Operation Deliberate Force also helped restore the credibility of both NATO and the wider 
international community. By Intervening militarily in Bosnia and Herzegovina the Alliance had 
moved definibvely out or area, that Is beyond Allied territory. Moreover. NATO demonstrated 
that it was capable both of overseeing a successful multinational military campaign and of 
using rorce to achieve non-Artide 5 objedives, that is objedives other than colledive 
defence. 
Under the terms of the Dayton Peace Agreement NATO became Involved In peacekeeping 
for the firsttlme. The Alliance led a 60 ODO-strong Implementation Force or IFOR to oversee 
implementation of the accord's military aspects and ensure that the country did not slide back 
into war. Moreover, the Bosnian deployment generated a series or additional benefits, 
including, for example, the Integration of some 2000 Russian troops and officers Into NA TO-
ied structures. In a move that had seemed Impossible only five years earlier, these soldiers 
worked side by side with their NATO peers for the next seven years. 
Operation Deliberate Force also heralded a much wider NATO engagement in and 
commitment to the Balkans. In 1999, NATO again successfully used force against Slobodan 
Milosevic and his military forces with a 78-<lay air campaign to halt ethnic cleansing in 
Kosovo. That campaign was followed by the creation and deployment of another NATO-led 
peaceKeeping mission, the Kosovo Force or KFOR, which remains deployed today. And in 
2001, NATO intervened in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia• in a preventive 
capacity to head off another war and restore peace and stability to the region. 
Although it tooK the Allies far too long to develop the necessary political consensus to 
intervene effectively in Bosnia and Herzegovina, once the Alliance decided to confront the 
causes of the conftict. it succeeded In rapidly ending the violence and then in developing the 
means to build peace. In this way, Operation Deliberate Force ushered In a new era for 
NATO, helping set the foundation for the much larger range of non-Article 5 missions that the 
Alliance is involved in today, and moving NATO way beyond the sole maintenance of its own 
collective defence. 
Ryan C. Hendrickson Is associate professor of po/i~cal science at Eastem Illinois University 
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